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Professor of Philosophy
Mount Mary University

“In this book, Benjamin Durheim builds bridges, creatively and with sensitivity, for theological resonance between thinkers one might rarely see in dialogue—Martin Luther and Louis-Marie Chauvet. His analysis of their theology, their questions and tensions, opens up areas of surprising consensus and continued challenges. Durheim is able, to use his own phrase, ‘to establish a common basis for theological exchange in the connection between sacraments and ethics.’”

— Dirk G. Lange
Associate Professor of Worship
Luther Seminary

Christ's Gift, Our Response

Martin Luther and Louis-Marie Chauvet on the
Connection between Sacraments and Ethics

Benjamin Durham



A Michael Glazier Book

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Introduction

The goal of this book is, in the first place, ecumenical. As the five hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Protestant Reformation approaches, questions of what it means to worship and live as a Christian community ecclesially divided from other Christian communities takes on renewed poignancy. The relationship of Christian worship (particularly sacraments) to Christian ethical life cannot be answered as if the term “Christian” were a generic term divorced from particular theological, sacramental, and ethical traditions. As such, this book focuses on a pair of theologians representing theological approaches of two Christian communions: Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism. Drawing on other traditions could certainly also be helpful, but these two traditions represent both the inception of the Protestant Reformation and some of the most sustained work in subsequent ecumenical engagement and dialogue. In this light, the central aim of this book is to build a new bridge across the Tiber (or at least to refurbish a neglected one) for theology in sacraments and ethics. Ideally, this will be a bridge over which insights can be transported without succumbing to the all-too-familiar pitfalls of Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue in these fields of theology.¹ Toward this end, the book works to establish a common basis for theological exchange in the connection between sacraments and ethics and tests the bridge by actually transporting some insights across—insights that can lend enrichment to each distinct side.

¹ E.g., forensic justification, causality, merit, and others. Such terms are discussed in this project, but the conversation is not built on them.

Why This Project?

One might rightly ask a significant question at the beginning of this project: why is a bridge across the Tiber a good idea at all? Without attempting to singlehandedly justify the Ecumenical Movement, we nevertheless ought to name some reasons this particular project is important. First, the field of sacramental theology has consistently been a source of theological tension between Lutherans and Roman Catholics, even when consensus is reached in other areas of theology. For example, the 1541 *Regensburger Buch* reached a remarkable consensus on the doctrine of justification but was ultimately rejected by both Luther and Rome because it failed to reach a similar consensus on the theology of the Eucharist.² What could have been a significant step in church unity instead stumbled over sacramental theology and yielded very little progress.

In a striking parallel, while the Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church were able in 1999 to publish together the *Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification*, the 1978 document of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic Dialogue on the Eucharist did not provide sufficient common ground for any visible unity in celebration, and by 2014 the Dialogue has only moved to the issue of baptism.³ In both the Colloquy of Regensburg and the current Lutheran–Roman Catholic Dialogue it is not soteriology that has prevented moving toward an expression of visible church unity but rather sacramental theology. If visible church division is a central ecumenical problem, then it is worship and sacraments—the embodied, visible actions of the church—that have played and continue to play a definitive role in how that problem can be addressed.

Second, talking across the Tiber about sacraments is a central part of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic Dialogue leading up to 2017. The Lutheran–Roman Catholic Commission on Unity has published a theological commemoration titled *From Conflict to Communion: Lutheran-Catholic*

² The Lutheran World Federation and the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, *From Conflict to Communion: Lutheran-Catholic Common Commemoration of the Reformation in 2017* (Leipzig, Germany: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013), 34. For a more in-depth study of the Colloquy of Regensburg, see Suzanne Hequet, *The 1541 Colloquy at Regensburg: In Pursuit of Church Unity* (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2009).

³ See the summaries at <http://www.lutheranworld.org/content/lutheran-roman-catholic-dialogue>.

Common Commemoration of the Reformation in 2017, which names baptism as the core basis for common commemoration.⁴ Common commemoration is, however, neither consensus nor communion. If communion is part of the ecumenical project, then continued and creative work in sacramental theology will be essential. In the context of this book, I attempt what I hope is some level of that creativity in building a bridge for theological resonance rather than consensus. Beyond the raw importance of sacramental theology, the reason this project unfolds as it does is because nearly half a millennium of searching for consensus in sacramental theology has simply not yielded it. Perhaps another approach—searching for resonance rather than confluence—will provide some small ways of moving forward where there previously had been none.

The intention is not to pretend that the search for theological resonance is a new approach to ecumenism. Rather, if the primary goal of an ecumenical conversation can be to strive to determine how each theology might *strengthen* the other rather than just how they might possibly coexist, the dynamic of the conversation changes from working across from one's conversation partner to working alongside one another. This does not mean collapsing theological positions together as if there were no differences. Instead, it means critically accessing the thought of one's partner as a source, not with the goal of creating communion, but with the goal of enriching one's own theological standpoint. An example of one dialogue that did this almost by accident is the lens for this project's engagement with Luther: the Finnish School of Luther Interpretation. Engagement with Orthodox Christians led to new insights in Luther scholarship, precipitating a point of contact between the two communions that had not previously existed. If ecumenical engagement cannot synthesize unity or communion by working toward them as goals, then perhaps unity and communion may grow if they are *not* the initial and immediate goals of ecumenical conversation. Let theological enrichment be the goal, and let communion be the byproduct—not vice versa.

Another major question one ought to ask at the beginning of this project has to do with its second aspect: why study the connection between sacraments and *ethics*? I chose that connection as the subject for this project because it is the connection between what are arguably the two most visible aspects of the church: its worship and the lives of its

⁴ *From Conflict to Communion*, 80–87.

members in society. If, as *Unitatis Redintegratio* states, “[ecclesial] division openly contradicts the will of Christ, scandalizes the world, and damages that most holy cause, the preaching of the Gospel,”⁵ then theological exchange in the most visible aspects of ecclesial life would be a fitting place to attempt to push back that division, scandal, and damage. This is not to say that the concept of the *invisible* church is unnecessary; it is certainly important, especially for Lutheran traditions. It is instead to say that if division is a scandal within the church and for its relationship to the world, then the fields that embody those areas—sacraments and ethics—ought to be ideal places for conversation.

Why Luther and Chauvet?

If the goal of this book is a Lutheran–Roman Catholic conversation on sacraments and ethics that is to resist simply rehearsing the traditional points and counterpoints of sacramental theology and how humans respond to God’s action in grace, then the theologies on which the conversation is based should also resist emphasizing those traditional points and counterpoints. As such, this project takes as its hermeneutical approach a relatively new interpretation of Luther, itself born out of an ecumenical conversation, and a late-modern Roman Catholic theologian, whose work both engages traditional sources and also departs from them in certain ways.

The Finnish School of Luther Interpretation grew out of conversations between Finnish Lutheranism and Orthodox Christianity. A more developed background of the School is laid out in chapter 1, but the reason this book takes the Finnish School as its hermeneutical lens for reading Luther is its consistent emphasis on justification as unification with Christ rather than justification as divine imputation. Divine imputation (sometimes called forensic justification) is not utterly alien or contradictory to the Finnish School, but it is also not simply the same idea in different words. By shifting the emphasis in justification away from the external action of God and toward the action of God as uniting with the human, the Finnish School opens up Lutheran theology for a more robust engagement with theologies that tend to highly value

⁵ Vatican Council II, *Unitatis Redintegratio: Decree on Ecumenism*, para. 1. All citations of documents from the Second Vatican Council are taken from *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents*, ed. Austin Flannery, rev. ed. (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014).

human participation in justification. This is not an abandonment of Lutheran soteriology or theological anthropology⁶ but rather a reading of Luther that is valid alongside the more traditional reading of justification by divine imputation. The result is the ability to read Luther in parallel with a Roman Catholic conversation partner and focus on a particular set of issues in sacraments and ethics that would be clouded by returning only to the Luther of justification by divine imputation, namely, the issues of the gift, ethics and passivity, and the communality of sacraments and ethics.

The Roman Catholic interlocutor that provides an ideal parallel to the Finnish School is the French priest Louis-Marie Chauvet. Like the Finnish School, Chauvet represents something of a departure from what is usually considered the more classic theologies of his ecclesial tradition. Chauvet's theology lifts up the concepts of the symbol and symbolic exchange as his starting points, in an effort to depart from what he sees as an overemphasis on causality in sacramental theology and theologies of grace. Growing out of this re-emphasis is a theological construction of Christian identity centered on the three building blocks of scripture, sacraments, and ethics, which makes Chauvet's construction perfect for the purposes of this book. Further, the symbol and symbolic exchange for Chauvet include an aspect of receiving the presence of the giver within the exchange itself, which provides a foundational point of contact with the "unification" spoken of by the Finnish School.

Apart from these reasons to build this project on the Finnish School of Luther Interpretation and Louis-Marie Chauvet, there still remains the issue of historical distance between Chauvet and Luther. Luther wrote in the sixteenth century, and Chauvet is still alive in the twenty-first. Words, traditions, and the reigning philosophical and theological problems have all gone through multiple centuries of development and change since Luther, so to plop him into a conversation with a late-

⁶ Other scholars would argue that the Finnish School is exactly this. See William W. Schumacher, *Who Do I Say That You Are? Anthropology and the Theology of Theosis in the Finnish School of Tuomo Mannermaa* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010). That said, such critiques of the Finnish School often tend to treat Luther as more systematic and consistent than his theology actually permits. It is my opinion that Luther's theology lends itself to a multiplicity of interpretations, which need not be seen as contradictory. Consequently, I treat the Finnish School as a legitimately distinct but not hostile interpretation of Luther to that of justification by divine imputation and build this project on it accordingly.

modern figure without attending in some respect to the distance between them would be unfair to the insights of both. That said, there are three main ways the book resists this unfairness. First, the lens through which Luther's theology enters this conversation is that of a late-modern theological movement, the Finnish School. The book does not pretend to apprehend the "true" sixteenth-century Luther and bring him into a conversation that would be largely outside his vocabulary. Instead, the book adopts the major tenets of a school of Luther interpretation that has its own conversation partners in the twenty-first century. It is true that Chauvet and the Finnish School have thus far had essentially no contact with each other, but their historical contexts are far more similar than Luther's is to Chauvet.

Second, in the places where the book *does* attempt to bring Luther into more or less direct conversation with Chauvet, the terms it employs to do this (e.g., the gift or presence) are studied carefully for their meanings in each theologian. On the basis of these studies, the book then presumes to help Chauvet and Luther to "talk" with one another. Further, where there is some commonality in terms, the book looks behind those terms to the theological agendas each thinker has in using them. For example, in chapter 4 when the book speaks of presence, Luther's concern is of the presence of Christ's promise, while Chauvet's is of the presence of Christ's absence. Yet even in these different concerns, there are points common to both approaches, to which the book then attends.

Third, with regard to the many terms that Luther and Chauvet do *not* hold in common, the book does not juxtapose them as if they do. Terms such as justification and symbolic exchange do not commonly appear in the work of both theologians, and where they might they do not mean exactly the same things. As such, these terms are used to orient each theology independently from the other, with the aim of looking for confluence only in terms where it is possible, and even then only with qualification. The goal of this book is to recognize resonances and appreciate mutual enrichment, not to attempt an amalgamation of the theologies.

Brief Overview of the Project

The first chapter begins with an introduction to the twentieth-century field of liturgy and ethics. While the goal of the book as a whole is particularly the connection between *sacraments* and ethics, the shared territory between sacraments and liturgy is considerable. The Liturgical

Movement in North America (particularly in the United States) takes center stage in its reassertion of the connection between liturgy and social justice. Figures such as Virgil Michel and Dorothy Day emphasized the connection between the liturgical celebrations of the church and its call to justice with particular fervor, even as the Liturgical Movement in Europe tended to underemphasize this connection. The chapter then moves to three contemporary theologians whose work is indebted to and yet goes beyond the work of the Liturgical Movement: Don E. Saliers, J.-M.-R. Tillard, and Bruce Morrill. The chapter concludes by placing Chauvet in his philosophical context and naming his major influences and by outlining the major points of the Finnish School of Luther Interpretation as well as the more traditional interpretations of Luther.

The second chapter examines the relevant areas of Luther's theology for the purposes of this discussion. The hermeneutic of the Finnish School is essentially assumed in this chapter, since it was outlined in chapter 1. Chapter 2 works through Luther's sacramental theology, especially under the terms of God's gifts of promise and presence, and then turns to the connection of sacraments and ethics as unification with Christ. Following the Finnish School, Luther's *Commentary on Galatians* serves as the guiding light for this section, giving content to what Luther means by justification and how that unfolds between sacraments and ethics, especially in light of Luther's view of the human as *simul iustus et peccator* (at the same time sinner and justified). Additionally, the chapter appropriates what it can from the more traditional interpretations of Luther, particularly the importance of death and life language, and a view of sanctification as "getting used to" being justified.

The third chapter studies the connection between sacraments and ethics in Chauvet. As two-thirds of Chauvet's tripartite model of Christian identity, Chauvet's views of sacraments and ethics depend heavily on his more foundational tenets of the symbol and his theological anthropology. As such, the first two sections of the chapter attend to how Chauvet conceives of these two areas, at which point the third section can more adequately study how sacraments and ethics interact in Chauvet's thought. Even as the symbol and theological anthropology provide the background for how Chauvet deals with sacraments and ethics, the concepts of the gift and grace emerge as the primary lenses through which he views the connection between sacraments and ethics. Having brought these terms to the fore, chapter 3 concludes with a setup for the fourth chapter.

The fourth and final chapter fleshes out the central goal of this book: a search for resonance and theological exchange between these two theologies that would be enriching for both of them in how they describe the connection between sacraments and ethics. To do this, the chapter names a common principle that both theologians hold—namely, the gift—and then studies tensions in both Luther and Chauvet that could be eased by appropriating certain aspects of the other's thought. For example, Luther's ethics tends to emphasize passivity to Christ's activity (which could lead to despair of one's own ethical action), and Chauvet's conception of the human person can at times seem to lack substantial content (which can lead to ethical complacency). Each theologian can offer insights to assist with these tensions in the other, and the chapter works to facilitate this assistance.

The conclusion then serves as a brief assessment of what has been accomplished. Quickly delineating the high points of each chapter, the conclusion shows how the goal of seeking out resonances and mutual enrichment between these two thinkers has found expression in the book and gestures toward some ways these resonances provide new or expanded areas for ecumenical conversation and work. Altogether, what this book offers is not unity between the thought of Luther and Chauvet—not even in this particular field of sacraments and ethics. Instead, the book provides a conversation between Luther and Chauvet whereby the traditions they represent might approach one another as sources of insight, critically appropriating the contributions each has to offer while remaining faithful to the theologies each embodies. Unity is not the goal, but my hope is that in some way, a kind of unity in theological purpose might nevertheless emerge as the result.

Chapter 1

Background: The Field of Liturgy and Ethics

Introduction

As the goal of this book is to draw into conversation Luther and Chauvet on the connection between sacraments and ethics, it is necessary to delineate how exactly such a conversation fits into the field of liturgy and ethics as a whole. Additionally, some conception of how and in what light the book will appropriate the work of these theologians, as well as the background that informs such a decision, will serve to set up the studies of chapters 2 and 3. Toward that end, this first chapter proceeds in four parts: first, the chapter traces the origins of renewed theological interest and work in liturgy and ethics, especially in the twentieth century. Second, the chapter gestures toward three current directions in theological scholarship concerning liturgy and ethics, with the goal of situating the current project within that milieu. Third, the chapter outlines Chauvet's philosophical background, providing a springboard for more explicit attention to his theology in the third chapter; fourth, the chapter situates the current project between two strains of interpretation of Luther: the New Finnish Interpretation of Luther, on the one hand, and what has been called "radical Lutheranism," on the other. Having done this, the project can proceed with its goal, reading Chauvet and Luther in light of each other on sacraments and ethics and allowing points of mutual enrichment to emerge.

Background: Liturgy and Ethics

While the relationship between liturgy and ethics has never been alien to Christian theological reflection, it took on renewed significance as a particular area of theological inquiry during the Liturgical Movement of the twentieth century. Especially in the United States, the conviction that what happens within the liturgy is intrinsically connected to the ways by which Christians engage and shape their societies became a theological tenet for many scholars of the Liturgical Movement. This first section of the chapter traces the social and theological circumstances that gave rise to such a tenet and briefly surveys the impacts of two central figures who embodied it: Virgil Michel and Dorothy Day. Having done this, the section traces the development of the emerging discipline of liturgy and ethics through the Second Vatican Council and finally outlines some contemporary directions in theology that are indebted to and participate in the field.

The Liturgical Movement

In its European origins, the Liturgical Movement was a theological expression of a nineteenth-century Christianity struggling to react to the challenges of modernity while rediscovering (and increasingly embracing) the concept of the church as the Mystical Body of Christ.¹ Particularly in Roman Catholic theology, strong reactions against the intellectual creativity of the Enlightenment and Modernism (embodied in part by the First Vatican Council in 1869–70, and more completely by the requirement of the Anti-Modernist Oath beginning in 1910) had the effect of channeling much of the church's creative theological reflection into liturgical theology. Study of the liturgy, right, wrong, or otherwise, was a field of inquiry in which theological development could and did take place. In France, widespread liturgical changes and reforms appeared in response to what were seen as pastoral needs, and in the aftermath of the French Revolution, renewed ecclesial attention to monasticism accomplished the dual task of reviving monastic liturgy and sparking interest in its study, particularly at the Benedictine abbey of Solesmes.² In Germany, Benedictine monks such as Odo Casel and Kunibert Mohlberg guided study of the liturgy toward a greater appreciation of the church as the Mystical Body of Christ, and in Belgium,

¹ Keith F. Pecklers, *The Unread Vision: The Liturgical Movement in the United States of America* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1998), 1.

² *Ibid.*, 2–4.

emphasis on active participation became a hallmark of the movement thanks to the work of theologians like Lambert Beauduin and events such as the National Congress of Catholic Works.³ Nevertheless, while these European geneses of the Liturgical Movement certainly provided a basis for what was to come, none of them stressed the connection of liturgy to justice and ethics with the fervor of the Liturgical Movement in the United States.⁴

The Liturgical Movement in the United States, while it embraced fundamental tenets like active participation that it imported from its European counterparts, ultimately grew into its context by stressing the integral link between liturgy and social justice. An increasingly urbanized and industrialized United States had by the 1920s become a juggernaut of *laissez-faire* capitalism that idolized the individual.⁵ Additionally, wealth distribution had become increasingly uneven, a trend that was thrown into tragic relief during the years of the Great Depression following the 1929 stock market crash. While unemployment soared and persevered throughout the 1930s,⁶ Christians—particularly Roman Catholics, whose sense of religious identity had enjoyed something of a revival in the 1920s—increasingly sought a sense of community and belonging in their churches, as opposed to within the secular society that had become such a bleak, isolating place.⁷ The concept of the Mystical Body of Christ provided fertile ground for theological reflection on this juxtaposition between Christian membership in church and the

³ *Ibid.*, 8–12.

⁴ This is not to say that the European Liturgical Movement was devoid of attention to social justice. Certainly, major figures (such as Lambert Beauduin) were greatly influenced by the ethical challenges occasioned by the Industrial Revolution, the pushback of papal encyclicals such as *Rerum Novarum* in 1891, and eventually the work of figures like Virgil Michel and Dorothy Day.

⁵ Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 82–84. See also Glenn Porter, *The Rise of Big Business: 1860–1920*, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), and Mark Hendrickson, *American Labor and Economic Citizenship: New Capitalism from World War I to the Great Depression* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁶ Pecklers claims that sixteen million people, or roughly one-third of the workforce, were unemployed during the worst of this period, and that number remained around ten million for the duration (Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 85). See also Robert McElvaine, *Down and Out in the Great Depression* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1983).

⁷ Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 84–86. For another biographical view of Virgil Michel, see R. W. Franklin and Robert L. Spaeth, *Virgil Michel: American Catholic* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1988).

same in society, providing the raw material for forging a link between the defining characteristics of each: liturgy, on the one hand, and social justice, on the other. Such a link was forged (or, perhaps more accurately, re-forged) in United States Catholicism from the point of view of both aspects of Christian life—the liturgical and the social. Both aspects warrant some attention, which we pay here through two key figures whose work embodied each direction of linking liturgy and social justice: Virgil Michel and his liturgical theology that connected itself to social action, and Dorothy Day and her social action that connected itself to liturgy.

Virgil Michel

Virgil Michel was a Benedictine monk of Saint John's Abbey in Collegeville, Minnesota, where he founded and edited the liturgical journal *Orate Fratres* (now *Worship*), founded Liturgical Press, and taught courses in English and philosophy at Saint John's University.⁸ While initially skeptical that monastic life would provide him with the ability and adequate opportunity “to study, to teach, and to promote the kingdom of God,” Michel nevertheless entered the novitiate in 1909 at the age of twenty and professed his solemn vows in 1913.⁹ By 1916, when he had selected the topic for his dissertation at The Catholic University of America—a study of the American thinker Orestes A. Brownson—Michel had developed an enduring conviction that justice, especially social reform, needed to be a central aim of both theology and Christian life.¹⁰ Michel's work on Brownson further solidified this conviction and added to it a vision of ecclesiology, especially the role of the laity as “a community of apostolic faith and authority.”¹¹ Following World War I, Michel studied both liturgy and philosophy in Louvain and Rome, and when he returned to the United States in 1926, he was “determined to pursue that harmonious relationship of liturgy and life in the Mystical Body of Christ.”¹² At this point Michel was utterly entwined in the growing Liturgical Movement in the United States, so much so that he suffered a nervous breakdown and spent three years recovering (most of which time he spent living with a community of Chippewa Native

⁸ Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 124.

⁹ Kevin E. Schmiesing, *Within the Market Strife: American Catholic Economic Thought from Rerum Novarum to Vatican II* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 88.

¹⁰ Paul B. Marx, *Virgil Michel and the Liturgical Movement* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1957), 3–7; Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 124–26.

¹¹ Patrick Cary, quoted in Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 125.

¹² Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 126.

Americans in northern Minnesota). As Keith Pecklers argues, these three years likely provided the experiential corollary to his already-formed intellectual stance on liturgy and social reform.¹³

Michel's theology itself took as its cornerstone the concept of the Mystical Body of Christ. That said, he thought of the Mystical Body "more as a spirituality, as a way of living in society, than as a theological doctrine."¹⁴ This fundamental aspect of Michel's thought—that its basis was in a way of *living* rather than a way of *thinking*—already points to the organic unity he saw between liturgy and social justice. Liturgy itself was for him an antidote for what had become quintessentially American individualism, a kind of lift-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps idolization of personal economic autonomy. By constituting the liturgical community as the Mystical Body of Christ, liturgy drove home that Christians were to live within society as that Mystical Body of Christ. Such a life would be false without striving for social justice. Conversely, liturgy as the embodiment of the eschatological kingdom demanded justice within the liturgical community also—that is, within ecclesiology.¹⁵ For Virgil Michel, liturgy emphasized the communal, just constitution of the church and was inseparable from the practice of communal action for justice in society.

Michel articulated his particular vision of social justice in this way: social justice is "that virtue by which individuals and groups contribute their positive share to the maintenance of the common good and moreover regulate all their actions in relation to the common good."¹⁶ Such a definition emphasizes not only the aspects of both individual and collective action for justice but also the fact that social justice is an ongoing task, obligation, or habit. Social justice was not, for Michel, a structural goal to be "accomplished" but rather an ideal by which Christians are both communally and individually formed and re-formed, and therefore also an ideal toward which to strive as the Mystical Body of Christ. For Michel, while liturgy is a specifically religious practice set apart in a way from what might be called "the rest of life," liturgy nevertheless loses much of its relevance unless it connects directly to the practice of the rest of life (which is what the bulk of this book simply

¹³ Ibid., 127–28.

¹⁴ Ibid., 132.

¹⁵ Ibid. A more developed study of Michel's ecclesiology can be found in Jeremy Hall, *The Full Stature of Christ: The Ecclesiology of Dom Virgil Michel* (Collegetown, MN: Liturgical Press, 1976).

¹⁶ Virgil Michel, "Defining Social Justice," *The Commonweal* 23 (1936): 425.

calls ethics). Liturgy and the rest of life are distinct from one another in Michel's thought, but much of his thought concerns the fact that, from a Christian perspective, they cannot be separated.¹⁷ In this way, liturgy for Michel is the formation of the Christian community as the community of social justice, the Mystical Body of Christ in the world. What better model for social justice could there be beside the model of justice, peace, and love incarnate? In Michel's words:

It is not too much to say that the revival of true social human life will be achieved only under the inspiration of the liturgical life, since the specific divine purpose of the latter is to transform human nature after the mind of Christ and inspire it unto a life replete like His with the love of God and man.¹⁸

Dorothy Day

While Dorothy Day might not always be thought of as a central figure in the Liturgical Movement in the United States,¹⁹ her commitment to drawing social activism together with liturgical participation (formal or informal) nevertheless made a significant impact on the Liturgical Movement. It is no coincidence that *The Catholic Worker*, the newspaper of social action Day edited until her death in 1980, consistently included articles dealing with liturgy generally and/or the Liturgical Movement specifically.²⁰ Day, drawing strength for her work from both private and public prayer,²¹ was a living example of the vision of liturgy and justice that Virgil Michel heralded.

Dorothy Day was born in 1897, and her young adulthood in the first decades of the twentieth century was characterized by a commitment to justice as she saw it formed by atheist socialism.²² Day converted to

¹⁷ For example, Michel was unsure the Liturgical Movement could survive without explicitly embracing the social apostolate (Virgil Michel, "The Liturgical Movement of the Future," *America* 54 [1935]: 6–7).

¹⁸ Virgil Michel, quoted in Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 135.

¹⁹ For example, selections of her writings often focus nearly exclusively on her writings for and about social justice. See Robert Ellsberg, ed., *Dorothy Day: Selected Writings* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2002).

²⁰ Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 111.

²¹ Dorothy Day, "Adventures in Prayer," in Ellsberg, *Dorothy Day*, 184.

²² Ellsberg, *Dorothy Day*, xix–xx. For a more complete picture of Day's life, see either her autobiography, *The Long Loneliness* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), or Jim Forest, *All Is Grace: A Biography of Dorothy Day* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2011).

Catholicism in 1927, and her commitment to justice lost none of its vigor. As Pecklers explains,

Together with [Peter] Maurin, Day found hope in the social documents of the Church. She was convinced, like Virgil Michel and the liturgical pioneers, . . . that the key to the restoration of a Christian social order in the United States was the doctrine of the Mystical Body. Day and Maurin set out on a radical path of Christian activism, opting for a life of voluntary poverty and inviting others to join them.²³

What began as a newspaper founded by Day and Maurin in 1933 quickly grew into the Catholic Worker network of hospitality houses aimed at providing not only food and shelter but also places where community could grow, sustained at least in part by celebration of the liturgy. The ordinariness of the liturgical elements struck a chord with Day; the messy, down-to-earth, everyday tasks and materials of the works of mercy connected to the experience of the divine not as something imported from without but as something present within, evoked by the liturgy.²⁴ Beyond the experience of the divine (and likely more important for Day and the Catholic Worker Movement), the liturgy was a place where the community that had been implicitly forming became explicitly united. In Day's words, speaking of the Compline liturgy celebrated in houses of the Catholic Worker, "It is the night prayer of the church, and God hears. The agnostic sings with the Catholic, because it is a communal act and he loves his brother. Our singing prepares us for another day. . . . The surroundings may be harsh, but where love is, God is."²⁵

This is not to suggest that for Day the liturgy simply provided a useful mechanism to keep Catholic Worker houses docile, distracted, or artificially unified. Liturgy was an optional aspect of participating in the Catholic Worker Movement, and yet in her eyes this did not make it less vital to the movement's operation. For Day, active participation in liturgical celebration provided another place for active participation in the Catholic Worker Movement, beyond the necessary everyday tasks it required. This concept of active participation, taken from the Liturgical Movement itself and partnered with the concept of the Mystical Body of Christ, became something of a nexus between social justice and liturgy.

²³ Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 105.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

²⁵ Dorothy Day, *Loaves and Fishes* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 214–15.

Liturgy and activism for social justice ultimately share the same aim, Day thought, and this was reinforced by correspondence between the Catholic Worker and Virgil Michel at *Orate Fratres*.²⁶ Both strive for identity and action as the Mystical Body of Christ. As Day explained, "We feel that it is very necessary to connect the liturgical movement with the social justice movement. Each one gives vitality to the other."²⁷

The Catholic Worker Movement was hardly the only social or lay movement to connect its work with liturgical practice. Other groups, such as Friendship House, the Grail Movement, and the Christian Family Movement also grounded themselves in liturgy and gleaned insight from the Liturgical Movement.²⁸ Day's leadership with the Catholic Worker, however, and her insistence on bringing the insights of the Liturgical Movement to bear on the Catholic Worker's social justice ministry, also impacted the Liturgical Movement in a way that continually stressed the integral relationship between liturgy and justice. In a word, Dorothy Day was for the Liturgical Movement what Virgil Michel was for the Catholic Worker: a figure whose work perhaps lay in another field but nevertheless an advocate and resource whose activism was a continual reminder of their shared goals.

Liturgy and Ethics through Vatican II

In the decades leading up to the Second Vatican Council, the work of Virgil Michel and Dorothy Day inspired continued scholarship and ministry connecting liturgy and the social call of the church. Their insights and examples were given added weight by Pius XII's issuing of *Mystici Corporis Christi* in 1943, explicitly affirming the model of the Mystical Body of Christ as an apt conception of the church. While the encyclical might be argued to be at least as concerned with how hierarchy might work within the model of the Mystical Body of Christ as with the model itself, it nevertheless had the effect of validating a cornerstone of the Liturgical Movement. This provided some well-needed hierarchical warrant, because, as Pecklers points out, "As late as 1942 the doctrine [of the Mystical Body of Christ] was being attacked as a 'new conception of the Church.'"²⁹

²⁶ Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 108–11.

²⁷ Mel Piehl, *Breaking Bread: The Catholic Worker and the Origin of Catholic Radicalism in America* (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1982), 84–85.

²⁸ See Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 115–24.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

Mystici Corporis Christi, along with the social encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*, provided the Liturgical Movement with something like ecclesiastical “cover,” in a certain way validating and protecting those who worked within the movement and its connection to social justice from being labeled as radicals, dangerous to the church. Such was the case with Reynold Hillenbrand, under whose leadership Chicago became a vibrant center for the Liturgical Movement and social Catholicism.³⁰ Hillenbrand, criticizing American individualism in many of the same ways Virgil Michel had, ceaselessly emphasized the concept of the Mystical Body of Christ in his teaching, claiming both that “the world is sick of individualism and must get over it” and that “liturgy is the most complete embodiment of the beauty of the Mystical body.”³¹ Hillenbrand’s commitment to the Liturgical Movement and social justice also led him to establish the first Summer School of Social Action for priests and, later on, another Summer School of the Liturgy. Such commitments also led him to be involved with the Grail Movement, which occasioned some trouble between him and the local bishop, ultimately leading to his removal from the seminary where he was rector. Hillenbrand was moved to a parish in Hubbard Woods, Illinois, which was transformed into a model of liturgy and social involvement; even in this move, Hillenbrand demonstrated his conviction that liturgical renewal and social action go together.³²

While figures such as Hillenbrand drew inspiration from the social encyclicals and *Mystici Corporis Christi* as well as from examples like Virgil Michel and Dorothy Day, others, such as Hans A. Reinhold, built on the insights of the Liturgical Movement and the Catholic Worker Movement to further develop theologically what it means to connect liturgy and social ethics.³³ Reinhold’s engagement with the thought of Virgil Michel and the Catholic Worker community led him to articulate a sacramental worldview springing from the idea of the Mystical Body of Christ. For

³⁰ Ibid., 145.

³¹ Reynold Hillenbrand, “Address at the National Liturgical Week, Worcester, 1955,” in *How Firm a Foundation: Voices of the Early Liturgical Movement*, ed. Kathleen Hughes (Chicago: Liturgy Training Publications, 1990), 134–35.

³² Pecklers, *The Unread Vision*, 145. For an in-depth study of Hillenbrand’s life and thought, see Robert Tuzik, *Reynold Hillenbrand: The Reform of the Catholic Liturgy and the Call to Social Action* (Chicago: Liturgy Training Publications, 2010).

³³ For a detailed study of Reinhold’s work and thought, see Julia A. Upton, *Worship in Spirit and Truth: The Life and Legacy of H. A. Reinhold* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2009).

Reinhold, participation in the Body of Christ in the liturgy (particularly the sacraments) ought to carry through to participation as the Body of Christ in society. In his words, "Since we are members of that Mystical Body, which prolongs the incarnation, the state of the body social is a liturgical concern. We who claim to live by the sacraments must be found in the forefront of those who work for a new society built according to the justice and charity of Christ."³⁴ Reinhold was hardly the first to argue for a sacramental worldview, but his emphasis on this way of connecting sacraments and social ethics continued the trend in the United States Liturgical Movement of stressing the imperative of justice alongside liturgical and sacramental renewal.

By 1962, when the Second Vatican Council commenced (beginning with *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, largely as a result of the Liturgical Movement),³⁵ work on the connection between liturgy and social justice had taken many forms in the United States. Nevertheless, this was only one small part of the greater Liturgical Movement. Especially in Europe, historical scholarship on liturgical rites and practices, coupled with reforms of liturgical style and language, tended to take precedence in liturgical theology over connecting it with ethics. As H. A. Reinhold noted, "We had no Virgil Michel in Germany. The close inter-connection of the liturgical revival with social reform . . . was never expressed in that forceful way in which you see it in the writings of the late Dom Virgil and *Orate Fratres*."³⁶ This lack of emphasis on what had been a hallmark of the Liturgical Movement in the United States persevered into the promulgation of *Sacrosanctum Concilium* in 1963, which, while it did speak briefly of the Eucharist as a "bond of charity"³⁷ and mentions in passing the sacraments' purpose to dispose the faithful to the practice of charity,³⁸ largely leaves the connection between liturgy and justice untouched. Other documents of Vatican II do attend in certain ways to this connection—for example, *Apostolicam Actuositatem* in 1965—but the language of the *Sacrosanctum Concilium* omits terms such as "justice," "ethics," and "morality."³⁹

³⁴ H. A. Reinhold, "A Social Leaven?," *Orate Fratres* 25 (1951): 518.

³⁵ Frank C. Senn, *Christian Liturgy* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1997), 629.

³⁶ Marx, *Virgil Michel*, 180.

³⁷ Vatican Council II, *Sacrosanctum Concilium: The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy*, para. 47.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 59.

³⁹ One of the reasons for this was likely that the American bishops were rather silent during the first session of Vatican II, though even had they not been, it would

Strikingly, while the connection between liturgy and social justice tended to remain a distinctive mark of the Liturgical Movement in the United States as opposed to in Europe (at least until after Vatican II), it also tended to be missed by Protestant appropriations of the Liturgical Movement in the United States. For example, twentieth-century Lutheranism in the United States was certainly indebted to the Liturgical Movement in its reemphasis on aspects like frequent reception of Holy Communion, the active participation of the laity, and the communal nature of the sacraments, but studies of this impact of the Liturgical Movement rarely mention either Virgil Michel or the connection to social justice and ethics.⁴⁰ In the years leading up to the turn of the twenty-first century, however, a number of theologians, Roman Catholic and Protestant, have returned to the connection of liturgy and justice, or liturgy and ethics, as both a theological tenet and a theological conclusion. Louis-Marie Chauvet is one major example of this return, but some snapshots of other figures are warranted in order to situate this discussion of sacraments and ethics in its correct theological context.

Contemporary Directions in Liturgy and Ethics

In the decades following the Second Vatican Council, many areas of theology underwent explosions of scholarly study and creativity similar to that which liturgical theology had in the early twentieth century. The development of contextual theologies, engagement with late-modern and postmodern philosophies, dialogue with the insights of postcolonial theories, and the massive technological advancement of recent years have all provided theology a rich milieu in which to develop.⁴¹ In this

be mere speculation to guess whether justice would have entered the conversation. For a detailed account of the first session of the council, see Xavier Rynn, *Vatican Council II* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999), 1–134.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Timothy C. J. Quill, *The Impact of the Liturgical Movement on American Lutheranism* (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), or Frank C. Senn, *Christian Liturgy*, 609–71.

⁴¹ For a description of contextual theology, see Stephen B. Bevans, *Models of Contextual Theology* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1992). The work of scholars such as Jacques Derrida, Michel de Certeau, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak embody representative postmodern and postcolonial theorization. See Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven F. Rendall (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2013). Thinkers such as Jean-Luc Marion (see his

theological context, inquiry into the relationship between liturgy and ethics has often been subsumed as a part of a thinker's larger project. As such, what follows are brief descriptions of three theologians whose scholarship will serve to gesture toward what work is currently being done in liturgy and ethics, thus locating this project within the discipline. The discussion begins with the theology of Don E. Saliers, whose work in liturgical theology has stressed aesthetics and affections and thereby works toward ethics. A summary of J.-M.-R. Tillard follows, whose ecclesiological work draws on and impacts liturgical theology. Finally, the discussion will close with the thought of Bruce Morrill, who has worked at the nexus of liturgical theology and political theology.

Don E. Saliers

Don E. Saliers, an American Methodist theologian, has written extensively on Christian worship and human affections, senses, and aesthetics.⁴² His work rarely proceeds, however, without attending to the ethical implications of his theological reflections. For Saliers, there is an "internal, conceptual link between liturgy and ethics,"⁴³ which springs from the law of belief (*lex credendi*) and the law of prayer (*lex orandi*)—a

Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey Kosky [Redwood City, CA: Stanford University, 2002], or *God without Being*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991]), along with volumes such as *Decolonizing the Body of Christ: Theology and Theory after Empire?* (David Joy and Joseph Duggan, eds. [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012]), have worked to engage with these theories from a Christian and/or theological perspective. For theological engagement of the massive advancement of technology, see Noreen Herzfeld, *Technology and Religion: Remaining Human in a Co-Created World* (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton, 2009), Brent Walters, *From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Postmodern World* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), or the essays in Nancy Murphy and Christopher C. Knight, eds., *Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology, and Religion* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).

⁴² See, for example, Don E. Saliers, *Worship Come to Its Senses* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1996), Don E. Saliers, *The Soul in Paraphrase: Prayer and the Religious Affections* (Memphis, TN: Order of Saint Luke, 1991), or Don Saliers and Emily Saliers, *A Song to Sing, A Life to Live: Reflections on Music as Spiritual Practice* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005).

⁴³ Don E. Saliers, "Liturgy and Ethics: Some New Beginnings," in *Liturgy and the Moral Self: Humanity at Full Stretch Before God*, ed. E. Byron Anderson and Bruce T. Morrill (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1998), 16.

link he terms the law of ethical action, the *lex agendi*.⁴⁴ For Saliers, liturgy is multivalent; it serves to accomplish many things, one of the foremost being ethical formation. Saliers, however, takes a slightly different approach than his forebears in the Liturgical Movement. Rather than focusing on the concept of the Mystical Body of Christ and a sacramental worldview (though these things can certainly be found in his thought), he argues that liturgy forms Christians for ethics affectively or, in a certain sense, aesthetically:

The relationships between liturgy and ethics are most adequately formulated by specifying how certain affections and virtues are formed and expressed in the modalities of communal prayer and ritual action. These modalities of prayer enter into the formation of the self in community.⁴⁵

Liturgy for Saliers, then, is a kind of group affective formation for ethical life. Such formation takes place, however, not simply as a human community forming its members on its own but rather as a human community being formed in worshiping relationship with God. Such a point might appear to go without saying, but the significance of this relationship with the divine for Saliers makes liturgy not simply affective and formative but also eschatological.⁴⁶ While Saliers's conception of liturgical eschatology is not as "realized" as that of some other contemporary theologians,⁴⁷ he is convinced that eschatology is inseparable from liturgical theology. If liturgy forms the community, the model for formation is the Kingdom of God. This means that Christian worship, focused as it is (and ought to be) on recalling and reflecting on the past events of salvation history, also participates in salvation history by looking forward to the final times and making them present. As Saliers notes, speaking of Christian Advent liturgies, "Are we to ponder the coming

⁴⁴ E. Byron Anderson and Bruce T. Morrill, "Introduction," in *Liturgy and the Moral Self*, 6.

⁴⁵ Saliers, "Liturgy and Ethics: Some New Beginnings," 17.

⁴⁶ Don E. Saliers, *Worship as Theology: Foretaste of Glory Divine* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1994), 14.

⁴⁷ See, for example, John Zizioulas's view of the eucharistic community as "exactly the same as" the universal church gathered around Christ (John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion* [Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary, 1985], 149), which, in Paul McPartlan's view, is "the future, eschatological assembly" (Paul McPartlan, *The Eucharist Makes the Church* [Fairfax, VA: Eastern Christian Publications, 2006], 169).

of Jesus in Bethlehem, or are we to look for his final victory over sin and death? The answer is yes to *both* questions.”⁴⁸

Beyond the eschatological character of Christian worship, Saliers argues that liturgy itself ought to be normative for Christian life and theology, particularly ethics. He acknowledges that theology *can* be done without consideration for liturgy, but doing so loses something essential to Christianity. In Saliers's words, “Christian ethics and the shape of the moral life cannot be adequately understood apart from how Christians actually worship God.”⁴⁹ The reason for this is that ethics for Saliers exists not as a set of rules in a vacuum but rather as actions lived out in relationship *with* God and community. As such, it is the location of the encounter with God and community—liturgy—that provides the quintessential opportunity for ethical formation and subsequent reflection. This activity of connecting liturgy and ethics for Saliers is an affective one; it operates on the level of human senses and emotions, and only subsequently on conscious reflection. As a result, liturgical art, style, and location for Saliers play essential roles for Christian worship in the service of what are more commonly thought of as liturgical elements: scripture, bread, wine, preaching, etc. Liturgy is an encounter with the divine and with one another, and such an encounter cannot help but be influenced and formed by the circumstances that surround and embody it.

One might think of the way Saliers connects liturgy and ethics as that of liturgy inspiring ethics, or liturgy translating the ethical call aesthetically. Such a formulation would be a way of naming grace for him: bringing Christians to encounter the kingdom of God they find in the gospel and drawing them into the challenge to embody that kingdom. In his words, “Authentic liturgy lures us by grace into a new pathos, now directed to the passion of God at the heart of the gospel.”⁵⁰ This being the case, it is worth noting that Saliers maintains there is a multiplicity of connections between liturgy and ethics, or at least as many ways of connecting them as there are human affections. As Saliers argues, “we must admit that it is misleading to speak of *the* relation between liturgy and ethics as though there were only one essential linkage. There is a multitude of linkages between liturgy . . . and the lived narratives of

⁴⁸ Saliers, *Worship as Theology*, 220. Emphasis in original.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

our lives.”⁵¹ For Saliers, liturgy is not only eschatological but also ethically formative in ways specific to the particular Christian encounters it facilitates. Liturgy and ethics cannot be separated from each other, but the links between them through affections and aesthetics are as varied as the contexts and communities in which they are practiced.

J.-M.-R. Tillard

The work of Canadian Dominican theologian Jean-Marie Roger Tillard is primarily ecclesiological, but the principal direction of his ecclesiology—that of communion ecclesiology—both finds its base on liturgical and ethical foundations and brings with it liturgical and ethical implications. For example, Tillard’s work *Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ: At the Source of the Ecclesiology of Communion* is an attempt to locate in the scriptures and the early church the basis for the church as communion. In that endeavor, however, Tillard relies at least partly on the organic unity of the community of faith, the celebrations of that community, and the ethical concerns of those in the community. In his words, “Confession of faith, liturgical worship, and concrete concern about others necessarily go together.”⁵² Tillard’s focus is not necessarily to tease out the liturgical or ethical implications his chosen theological bases provide, but his work is nevertheless pregnant with them.

The overarching concept that provides the structure for much of Tillard’s work is undoubtedly the concept of communion.⁵³ The very basis of Christian life, Tillard argues, is relationship with others (and God), and the Christian model of right relationship is communion. Much could be said about how Tillard conceives of communion, but for our purposes, two integral aspects of communion stand out: communion is ethical, and communion is liturgical. Both of these aspects mean that for Tillard communion cannot be conceived of merely as a state; communion contains within its very core the actions of those who share it. In Tillard’s words, “If we needed to characterize in one word the fundamental inspiration of Christian behavior, we would speak of communion—communion with God and others in faith, charity, and hope.”⁵⁴

⁵¹ Ibid., 187.

⁵² J.-M.-R. Tillard, *Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ: At the Source of the Ecclesiology of Communion* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2001), 18.

⁵³ See, for example, J.-M.-R. Tillard, *Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1980).

⁵⁴ Tillard, *Flesh of the Church*, 1.

Beyond connoting superficial getting-along-with persons or groups of people who claim the name Christian, communion for Tillard is bound up with the actions of those persons and communities. This is to say that, for Tillard, communion has as much a horizontal dimension as a vertical one. The communion of Christ (which is Christian communion, the communion of the church) has an ethical dimension, because, as Tillard states, “Where the communion of Christ Jesus is not present, the Christian way of being is absent. . . . This relation to Christ is inseparable from the relation to others. The other implies others.”⁵⁵

Beyond its ethical dimension for Tillard, Christian communion also has a necessary liturgical dimension. Communion in Tillard’s thought is never simply human community; it is communion with Christ, and that basis undergirds all forms of Christian communion. In this light, the liturgical dimension of communion is constitutive; it is in the liturgy (primarily in the Eucharist) that Christians renew and celebrate communion with Christ and one another. This is, for Tillard, like the ethical dimension of communion, inseparable from communion as a concept: “The Eucharist is explained by the Church, the Church is explained by the Eucharist.”⁵⁶

In Tillard’s thought, the connection between liturgy and ethics is not the primary focus, but it does not need to be in order for his thought to be informative of current directions of work on the subject. Tillard’s primary focus—communion, especially in the context of ecclesiology—rests on a foundation of both liturgy and ethics. There are certainly other aspects of Tillard’s thought concerning communion, but liturgy and ethics remain constitutive for him. Neither the ethical dimension nor the liturgical dimension can stand on its own as the background for communion, and neither is communion self-reliant; it requires the other two. Tillard’s work, ecclesiological as it is, builds on and impacts liturgical theology and ethics.

Bruce Morrill

American Jesuit Bruce Morrill’s principal work in liturgy and ethics appears in his book *Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory*, in which he draws figures from both political and liturgical theology into conversation. Primarily using the work of Johann Baptist Metz and Alexander Schmemmann, Morrill provides an example of ways in which theologians whose

⁵⁵ Ibid., 3–4.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 28.

fields do not necessarily cross can be used to enrich one another's thought. Morrill's main objective in *Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory* is not simply to show that liturgy and ethics (or politics) are connected but rather to additionally tease out liturgical and ethical implications via a conversation between theologians whose work has already demonstrated that connection. The "pressing question," Morrill maintains, is "whether and to what extent the liturgy is able to shape the life of the Church and its mission in the modern world."⁵⁷

The fundamental points Morrill draws from Metz are the interdependence of mysticism (liturgy) and politics (ethics), on the one hand, and their distinct integrities, on the other.⁵⁸ For Metz, mystical practices are goods in themselves, insofar as "profound human freedom (so greatly inhibited in late-modern culture and society) is experienced when believers give themselves over to the narrative and symbolic world of the sacramental liturgy."⁵⁹ The role of liturgy is in this way, for Metz, "not simply an instrumental one in relation to ethics and politics,"⁶⁰ but liturgy does embody a kind of ethical and political urgency because of its eschatological emphasis. Christian liturgy contains within it both a remembering of the past and an expectant anticipation of the future, specifically the future end of days and coming of God's reign. As Morrill explains, "For Metz, the purpose of immanent expectation of the parousia, belief in a definite end of time, prevents Christian faith (the practice of imitating Christ) from succumbing to resignation and apathy."⁶¹ Christian liturgy is *both* valuable in itself *and* instrumental for the imitation of Christ, i.e., Christian ethical living.

Conversely, the *imitatio Christi* (which for Metz seems to capture the goal of Christian ethical and political life) is both a good in itself and an aid to the Christian experience of liturgy. On the one hand, Christian faith is itself for Metz the practical imitation of Christ; it is "about a life lived with interest in the suffering of others, for which the apocalypse will be the definitive revelation of the God of Jesus as the God of the living and the dead."⁶² *Imitatio Christi* is, for Metz, what Christian life ought to look like. The imitation of Christ also feeds into liturgical

⁵⁷ Bruce Morrill, *Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory: Political and Liturgical Theology in Dialogue* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2000), 19.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 190–91.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 190.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 199.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 189.

practice, however, because it is those who imitate Christ—specifically Christ's mercy—that in turn recognize Christ more clearly in liturgical celebrations. As Morrill explains it, "The mercy at the heart of the Gospel which Christians receive, at the heart of God whom they confess at baptism, at the heart of Jesus whom they commemorate at the Eucharist, is only genuinely *known* by those who *act* mercifully in history and society."⁶³ Christian ethics and political action—the *imitatio Christi*—are themselves both goals of Christian faith and aids to Christian liturgy.

Morrill draws on Schmemmann as a dialogue partner for Metz mainly because of Schmemmann's way of conceiving of liturgy and Christian knowledge. As Morrill says, "In [Schmemmann's] own work he explicitly argued for the practice of liturgy as a privileged form of knowing, indeed, the fundamental way in which believers know and appropriate the content of faith."⁶⁴ For Schmemmann, liturgical practice is paradigmatic for the Christian worldview, a claim that can be read as nearly the inverse of Metz's concept of the importance of mysticism for politics. While Schmemmann argues for liturgical practice as a primary way of Christian knowing, Metz points out that true knowledge in the liturgy depends at least in part on the imitation of Christ outside the practice of liturgy. Morrill does not play these two views against one another, but sees them as mutually enriching; in both views, Christian life in the world and Christian life in liturgy are inextricably linked.

One other field in which Morrill sees a possibility for discussion between these two figures is eschatology. While Metz emphasizes the liturgical anticipation of the parousia, for Schmemmann the liturgy itself is a moment of the parousia breaking into history.⁶⁵ For Metz, the liturgy has an apocalyptic character; for Schmemmann, the liturgy has a character of realized eschatology. Metz's concern is that liturgy energizes the Christian community for political and ethical action, but in what might be seen as a complementary way, Schmemmann conceives of the liturgy *not* as anticipating a future political or ethical moment toward which humans ought to strive but rather as an experience *of* that future mo-

⁶³ Ibid., 203. Morrill's insight into the liturgical life of Christianity continues in others of his works, notably his contributions to *Bodies of Worship: Explorations in Theory and Practice* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2000), and his works *Divine Worship and Human Healing: Liturgical Theology at the Margins of Life and Death* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2009), and *Encountering Christ in the Eucharist: The Paschal Mystery in People, Word, and Sacrament* (New York: Paulist Press, 2012).

⁶⁴ Morrill, *Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory*, 191.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 192.

ment in the present. The effects may be quite similar, but the models remain distinct.

The goal of Morrill's project is not simply to juxtapose two theologians; he additionally wishes to draw implications from this discussion for the liturgical and ethical life of the church. (This method mirrors some of the goals of this book.) Two of the implications he names bear mention here: first, the interplay of liturgy and ethics (or mysticism and politics) provides a source for ecclesial renewal that neither field could provide on its own. Political action itself is not enough to reinvigorate the life of the church, and neither is liturgical celebration on its own. As Morrill points out, borrowing from Metz, "Only if believers are engaged in the dialectical praxis of mysticism and politics can they experience the faith as an ongoing hunger and urgent desire for the just and loving God revealed in the person and gospel of Jesus."⁶⁶ Second, the interplay of liturgy and ethics is multilayered. Christian ethics and political action take many forms, and not every form can resonate with a liturgical practice. Likewise, Christian liturgical practices are not interchangeable, so one ought not to expect everything that is required for ecclesial renewal to spring forth from just one or a few of them. For Morrill, liturgy is connected to ethics and politics, but it is not a silver bullet.

Background: Louis-Marie Chauvet

Louis-Marie Chauvet is a French Catholic priest, currently employed as a pastor in the Diocese of Pontoise. Born in 1942, Chauvet was ordained a priest in 1966 and was a professor at L'Institut Catholique de Paris until he took up his current ministry.⁶⁷ While his major scholarly works include but three volumes and a host of articles, he has gained considerable influence in liturgical and sacramental theology in the United States, at least in part because of the organic unity his theology maintains between sacraments and ethics.⁶⁸ Chauvet's theological background and conversation partners will be explained in greater detail in chapter 3 below, but in order to situate that discussion, an understanding

⁶⁶ Ibid., 211–12.

⁶⁷ Joseph John Fortuna, *Two Approaches to Language in Sacramental Efficacy Compared: Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae and Louis-Marie Chauvet*, (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 1989), 3–4.

⁶⁸ Such a unity meshes easily with the scholarship that springs from the Liturgical Movement in the United States, with its emphasis on liturgy and social justice.

of his philosophical influences is warranted. What follows is a summary of three philosophical figures on whose insights Chauvet's theology relies. First, Martin Heidegger provides the background for Chauvet's resistance to metaphysics, his conception of language, his suspicion of immediacy, and the ways he conceives of presence and absence. Second, the philosopher/anthropologist Marcel Mauss is the primary source for Chauvet's concept of symbolic exchange and the gift. Finally, Jacques Derrida, as a philosophical contemporary of Chauvet, represents a counterpoint to developing the concept of the gift and symbolic exchange after Mauss. As such, Derrida's work serves to throw Chauvet's insights into sharper relief.

Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger provides a good deal of the philosophical foundation for Chauvet's project. Chauvet's suspicion of classical metaphysics and its operation in theology is heavily indebted to Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, as is his understanding of language, mediation, and the concepts of presence and absence.

Heidegger's critique of metaphysics takes as its major thrust the conviction that the Western philosophical tradition (that is to say, philosophy based in metaphysics from the thought of the Ancient Greeks onward) has forgotten the essential difference between Being and beings. Beings (*Seinde*) are for Heidegger simply objects, or "things that are."⁶⁹ This is not Heidegger's problem, as objects have always been part of the stuff of philosophy. What a thing is in itself, what it is accidentally, or how it appears have all been questions that, from early on, humans have asked concerning both themselves and the realities that have surrounded them.

Heidegger's trouble begins when speaking about Being itself (*Sein*) rather than beings.⁷⁰ If beings are objects that can be said to exist, then metaphysics has tended to treat Being like another noun, namely, the "stuff" that is common to all beings.⁷¹ To be fair, Heidegger acknowledges that metaphysical reflection on Being has been somewhat distinct

⁶⁹ Glenn P. Ambrose, *The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet: Overcoming Onto-Theology with the Sacramental Tradition* (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2012), 11.

⁷⁰ See Richard Polt, *Heidegger: An Introduction* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1999), 23–27.

⁷¹ Louis-Marie Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 26.

from reflection on beings. Beings are finite or limited, while Being may not be. Beings can be both causes and effects, while Being only causes. To be blunt, metaphysics throughout the Western tradition has tended to maintain that Being is, for lack of a better explanation, the “ground and cause” of all beings.⁷² Heidegger’s critique of this conception of Being is not that he has an alternative and/or better way to describe Being but rather that the very grammar by which such formulations approach Being already betrays an assumption of the essential identity between Being and beings.⁷³ Beings *are* objects that appear as given. Being *is* the ground/cause of all beings. These two sentences describe two different things (Being and beings), but they remain *things*, that is, Being has been reduced to the order of beings. This problem presents itself any time one attempts to explain what Being *is*. Whenever one may begin a sentence with “Being is (fill in the blank),” one has already begun with the assumption that Being is a kind of stuff, *something* that can be used as the subject of a sentence. For Heidegger, this is the mistake of metaphysics. One ought not to think of Being as the subject of a sentence; instead, one ought to think of Being more as a verb. In Glenn P. Ambrose’s words, “*Sein* is more an event or process by which *Seinde* are made manifest.”⁷⁴

This conception of Being as more like a process or activity than like a kind of stuff or ground carries ramifications beyond simply how we might think of what *is*. *How* we think of what is—or rather, how we formulate thoughts at all—is also linked to Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics. This, for Heidegger, is the issue of language, namely, the issue of whether language is a tool used by humans to express thoughts that are prelinguistic, or whether language is intrinsic to the process of thought itself. With the same move that we will see Chauvet make in chapter 3, Heidegger’s stance is that language is not instrumental but constitutive of human existence. Speaking from the human point of view, “language is the house of being.”⁷⁵

⁷² Ambrose, *The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet*, 12. See also Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University, 2000), 79–97.

⁷³ Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 55–78.

⁷⁴ Ambrose, *The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet*, 11.

⁷⁵ Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in *Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger*, ed. David Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 217. For Heidegger himself on language, see his *On the Way to Language* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), or his

All this makes for a reality that can be experienced only as mediated, but the question might be asked: if Being is more a verb than a noun, that is, something that beings *do* (or perhaps something that is done to them) rather than something that lurks behind or under beings, what sort of mediation could there possibly be between Being and beings? They might seem to be *immediately* connected. Heidegger insists, however, that there can be no immediacy of beings to Being; to understand his reservations, one must appreciate Heidegger's notions of presence and absence in relation to Being and language.

For Heidegger, immediacy between a being and Being (or even between a being and itself, or between beings) is illusory because at its base such a concept is subject to critiques analogous to his critique of the metaphysical tradition more generally speaking. To assume immediacy between a being and Being has already fallen into the trap of speaking of Being as an entity.⁷⁶ Further, even if Being is spoken of as a verb, to speak of immediacy between a being and its Being still domesticates the concept of Being; it suddenly is something to which we have unconditional access, and the concept is drained of its essential mystery.

Instead of immediate presence of Being to beings, Heidegger maintains that Being's presence is always characterized by a certain absence, or a withdrawal of Being from beings. One might envision such a withdrawal, or the component of absence within presence, in relation to a being normally conceived of as present-at-hand. Heidegger uses the example of a cabinetmaker and the wood he or she uses as part of the craft.⁷⁷ On a surface level, the cabinetmaker uses the wood to create his or her wares. For a cabinetmaker who is truly proficient in the craft, however, there is an element of the wood that retreats from the maker's gaze. The cabinetmaker does not necessarily approach the wood and dictate what is to be made and how; instead, he or she to a certain extent discovers what the wood can do and is sensitive to the potential hidden in each piece. The wood, inanimate in every respect as long as one approaches it in everydayness, takes on a life—where did it come from, what can it do, how can it best be worked to show forth its cur-

Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: HarperCollins, 2001). For a somewhat more digestible explanation, see Jeffrey Powell, *Heidegger and Language* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2013).

⁷⁶ Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 55–78.

⁷⁷ Martin Heidegger, "What Calls for Thinking?," in Krell, *Basic Writings*, 379.

rently veiled beauty? These and other considerations constitute a kind of dialogue between the cabinetmaker and his or her materials: they are no longer present-at-hand; they are present, but they also retreat into absence.⁷⁸

Analogously, Being itself is present to beings, but only by also withdrawing into absence in the very act of its presence. This is the point of mediation and the nexus of Being and language. In Ambrose's words, "Language, like Being, is akin to a living presence which arrives and withdraws. It is an announcing and a letting-come forth."⁷⁹ Just as humans' usual experience of the world is prone to sinking into everydayness, so humans' usual experience of language is that of the everyday, one-dimensional, present-at-hand tools for the expression of thoughts. Again like Being, however, language in its more full (or correct) sense is not simply a tool employed by humans; it is, rather, an activity that makes humans who and what they are. Humans may experience language as a given—as a set of instruments to be worked with until one obtains some desired result—but while language is this in some sense, it is also more than this. In the same way that the skilled cabinetmaker both uses wood and tools and discovers in the wood and tools a reality that retreats beyond his or her gaze, the person skilled with language (for Heidegger, the poet) both uses words and phrases and discovers in them the presence of a certain absence—a fullness of meaning that one cannot immediately grasp. Language expresses reality, but it also veils it.⁸⁰

All this means that when conceiving of beings, Being, and language, the world is, for Heidegger, far deeper than our everyday experience of it. Heidegger's response to this everydayness is not, however, an active seeking for the reality hidden under our world and words. Such a response would be to strive again for immediacy, to attempt again to reduce Being and language to the level of everydayness. Instead, Heidegger describes an approach to reality he calls *Gelassenheit*. Huston Smith summarizes the concept succinctly: *Gelassenheit* is a "reverent, choiceless letting-be of what is in order that it may reveal itself in the essence of its being."⁸¹ Notice that this has both an active and a passive component:

⁷⁸ Ibid., 374–80.

⁷⁹ Ambrose, *The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet*, 18.

⁸⁰ See Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*.

⁸¹ Huston Smith, *Beyond the Post-Modern Mind* (Wheaton, IL: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1982), 87.

active because one ought to *let* what is simply *be*, and passive in that what *is* reveals itself—it is not apprehended as if such a thing were a task. *Gelassenheit* does not obliterate everydayness; it operates within our everyday world as a sort of stance or attitude, a consent to the fact that our reality is more than simply its surface level.⁸² *Gelassenheit* acknowledges that our world is experienced as everyday and yet consents to the mediation of deeper, more profound reality by the very language or beings we experience in everydayness.

Marcel Mauss

Most of the philosophical background Chauvet draws outside of Heidegger is found in recent discussions of the philosophy of the gift. In this regard, Marcel Mauss's 1950 work *Essai sur le Don* is seminal. The essay is essentially a study of traditions and customs of gift giving kept by non-modernized or ancient peoples (the subtitle of the work is, tellingly, *The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*),⁸³ but in it Mauss points out perhaps *the* main issue that quickly became the chief subject of discussion in philosophies of the gift.

Mauss's main insight is that gift giving, in basically every society he studies, has both a voluntary and obligatory aspect. He makes this explicit when he explores the tradition of the potlatch in the American Northwest; there is an obligation to give, to receive, and to reciprocate. In very brief summary: according to Native American custom, the potlatch is an event or gathering in which gifts are exchanged. The essence of the event is that some person in a position of honor and wealth, demonstrating that such honor and wealth is deserved, gives a lavish party and distributes gifts copiously to the visitors. This could be on the occasion of a wedding, a funeral, or a "summit" of sorts with other groups or tribes, but the main thrust of the event is the excessive consumption and giving away of goods. Mauss relies on Davy in describing four distinct kinds of the potlatch, but he maintains that in terms of gift, reception, and reciprocation, they are "comparatively identical."⁸⁴ Mauss's point in this study is that the concept of the gift supports entire

⁸² Timothy M Brunk, *Liturgy and Life: The Unity of Sacraments and Ethics in the Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet* (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 105.

⁸³ Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990).

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 38–39.

systems of economy that exist apart from our current conception of the market or money economy.⁸⁵ There is certainly obligation in the gift economy, but it does not unfold in the same way the market economy does—more changes hands than just money. Exactly *what* changes hands in addition to money is something Mauss only hints at, but this point is the beginning of late-modern discussion of the gift. The insight that it is more than goods that changes hands in gift giving provides the basis for further, more philosophical reflection on the gift—both in Chauvet and his contemporaries.

Jacques Derrida⁸⁶

Moving forward from Mauss, perhaps the most influential philosopher on the subject of the gift has been Jacques Derrida.⁸⁷ While Chauvet does not cite him extensively on the subject of the gift, Derrida's contributions do frame a good portion of the conversation of which Chauvet is a part, and he provides an illustrative counterpoint to Chauvet that will help throw Chauvet's insights into sharper relief. For Derrida, the gift is what he terms "the impossible."⁸⁸ *Giving* is not necessarily impossible (though it is only in light of death that giving and taking are really possible for Derrida),⁸⁹ but giving *a/the gift* is the

⁸⁵ Ibid., 3–4.

⁸⁶ Much of this section on Derrida (pp. 25–29) is adapted from another article of mine that appeared as "Symbolic Exchange and the Gift: Louis-Marie Chauvet and Jacques Derrida in Dialogue," *Obsulta* 4 (2011).

⁸⁷ One ought to note, however, that the late modern period has seen multiple philosophical and theological reflections on and theories of the gift. For theological approaches, see Jean-Luc Marion's *Being Given*, as well as John Milbank, *Being Reconciled* (London: Routledge, 2003) and Antonio López, *Gift and the Unity of Being* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2013). For philosophical approaches to the gift beyond Derrida, see Eric R. Severson, ed., *Gift and Economy: Ethics, Hospitality and the Market* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2012), or Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006), 479–86. An interesting conversation between Derrida and Marion on the gift can be found in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, eds., *God, the Gift, and Post-modernism* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1999).

⁸⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 7.

⁸⁹ Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret*, 2nd ed., trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 45. The relation of the gift to death is a worthy topic in order to completely understand where Derrida is coming

impossible. As such for Derrida, one cannot speak discursively of the gift; it is an enigma.

Note that Derrida does not claim the gift is impossible as an act. He claims instead that as a concept, the gift is *the* impossible. This distinction may seem slight, but understanding what Derrida means in this regard helps clarify (relatively speaking) the rest of what he does with the gift. As an example, there are certain things in the world that are impossible: palm trees do not grow in the tundra, it is impossible to see amoebas without a microscope, and people will never be wholly satisfied with whatever the current tax rate is. A specific type of impossibility characterizes these impossible things, however: they are impossible because some element in them is left wanting. Palm trees want for hardiness; if they could survive colder temperatures, perhaps they could indeed grow in the tundra. The human eye wants for keenness; if it were a good deal keener, we might be able to see amoebas without using microscopes. And, of course, if taxes were just and humans were patient and charitable, perhaps everyone could indeed be satisfied with the rate of levy.

In each of these situations, want precipitates impossibility. Nevertheless, one could imagine a world in which these things would not be impossible. The issues are *derivatively* impossible (my word, not Derrida's); if circumstances were different, they might in fact be achievable. This is qualitatively different from the impossibility Derrida ascribes to the gift. For Derrida, the gift is *the* impossible, that is, the essence of what makes a gift also makes it impossible. This might be called *intrinsic* impossibility (again, not Derrida's word), and it also has its members: round squares, hot ice, vegetarian veal, and other things that border on the absurd. Absurdity is the direction in which Derrida takes his thought on the gift. As *gift*, the gift is impossibility. Its impossibility does not derive from anything lacking about the concept, the material, or the performance. Rather, it is the impossible precisely because those things that constitute it are—as a set—impossible. Neither is this due to some imperfection of gift giving; it is exactly the *purity* of the gift—the necessary purity for Derrida—that utterly separates it from the realm of the possible.

from with the concept of the gift. This discussion limits itself, however, to a brief outline of Derrida's vision, and so will draw almost exclusively from his work *Given Time* rather than *The Gift of Death*.

The constitution of the gift in Derrida, that is, the essential elements that precipitate the gift's impossibility, might be thought of as threefold: (1) the structure of the gift, (2) the character of the gift, and (3) the matter of the gift.⁹⁰ The first constitutive element of the gift, that of its structure, Derrida explains as deriving basically from convention: "some 'one' intends to give or gives 'something' to 'someone other.'" ⁹¹ For the gift to be a gift, there ought to be a giver, a gift, and a receiver; absence of any of these three components causes the gift to present itself to us as incomplete.⁹² Derrida points out that this structure in the end amounts to a tautology; if we try to explain what the structure of the gift is, we immediately assume that our audience already has some "precomprehension" of the gift. In his words, when I define the gift's structure, "I suppose that I know and that you know what 'to give,' 'gift,' 'donor,' 'donee' mean in our common language."⁹³ This is the first constituent and also the first trouble with the gift—any attempt to apprehend its structure of giver-gift-receiver presupposes its definition in the explanation—but this does not, on its own, make the gift the impossible (this point requires the other two also to do that).

The second constitutive element of the gift, its character, is what ought to separate it from an economic exchange of goods or services: the gift must be gratuitous. As Derrida articulates, "For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, counterfeit, or debt."⁹⁴ In essence, the gift must be free, in all senses of the term. On a certain level this character of the gift would be obvious, but Derrida takes a very hard stance on the purity of the gift's gratuitousness. For him, *any* reciprocity for a gift given is tantamount to repayment (which nullifies the gift), *any* satisfaction or even giving intention on the part of the giver is the same as reimbursement (also nullifying the gift), and even any *recognition* of the gift or the giver on the part of the receiver is equal to compensation (which, of course, nullifies the gift as well).⁹⁵ The character of gratuitousness is itself the problematic—it does not

⁹⁰ Here I mean matter as body or material, not matter as issue or problem.

⁹¹ Derrida, *Given Time*, 11.

⁹² This is not to say that each component must be recognized by the others; rather, the gift needs to have each of these three parts to be considered any kind of transfer at all.

⁹³ Derrida, *Given Time*, 11.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 12, 13, 14, 16, 23.

on its own make the gift the impossible, but joining it to the structure and matter of the gift does.

The third constitutive element of the gift—its matter—has to do with its necessary dependence on systems of economy and value. While the gift must be gratuitous, the gift itself must have some value in order to qualify as a gift. What gift could be a gift if it were in no sense valuable, at least to some degree? Further, a gift's value is generally determined by an economy, whether it is of simple economy or of symbolic value. This is what Derrida means when he says, "Now the gift, *if there is any*, would no doubt be related to economy. One cannot treat the gift . . . without treating this relation to economy, even to the money economy."⁹⁶ The point for Derrida is that the gift is inseparable from value and economy, on the one hand, but that, on the other, it *must* be in a way separated from value and economy. The circle of economic exchange is assumed by the gift, but it must remain foreign to the gift. In Derrida's words, "If the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain *aneconomic*. Not that it remains foreign to the circle, but it must *keep* a relation of foreignness to the circle."⁹⁷ If the gift touches economy, then it is no longer a gift, but if it is completely separated from economy, then likewise it is no longer a gift. Again, this on its own does not preclude the possibility of the gift, but when it is taken with the other two constitutive elements, the gift remains the impossible.

While Derrida goes to lengths to explain why the gift is the impossible, he nevertheless does not completely rule out the gift's reality. Derrida circumvents the inherent impossibility of the gift by arguing that the gift, if there is any, takes place only on the condition of forgetting.⁹⁸ For Derrida, if the gift is recognized as what it is, it vanishes. Recognizing the gift as what it is would require seeing the structure, character, and matter all at the same time—and that is exactly what is impossible about the gift. The very constitution of the gift makes it the impossible, so recognition or remembrance of the gift jars it out of reality and hides it again in impossibility. Derrida does not argue that the gift is an impossible phenomenon; instead, he argues that it cannot present itself *as* a phenomenon, because as a phenomenon it is the impossible. In Derrida's words, "The gift *itself*—we dare not say the gift in *itself*—will

⁹⁶ Derrida, *Given Time*, 7. Emphasis in original.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Emphases in original.

⁹⁸ Derrida, *Given Time*, 16–18.

never be confused with the presence of its phenomenon.”⁹⁹ Therefore, for the gift to take place, it relies completely on the condition of forgetting—both the forgetting of the giver and of the receiver.

In their own ways, Heidegger, Mauss, and Derrida each provides an essential part of the philosophical backdrop against which Chauvet plays out his theology. Chauvet, of course, also draws from explicitly theological sources, but these will be attended to in greater detail in chapter 3. At this point, having situated Chauvet in the philosophical context in which his work unfolds, this discussion now turns to situating Luther in the interpretive context relevant to this discussion, that is, to summarizing the major interpretations of Luther that will frame the second chapter’s study.

Background: Strains of Luther Interpretation

The work of Martin Luther has shaped the trajectories of Western Christian theology in more ways than can be concisely summarized here. While his thought has inspired the theologies of a number of traditions in various ways, this discussion focuses on one emerging vein of interpretation of Luther and adopts it as a kind of hermeneutic through which to read his work on the connection between sacraments and ethics. The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther, with its emphasis on justification as unification with Christ, will provide in chapters 2 and 4 something of a new way of engaging a Roman Catholic conversation partner in Chauvet. A conversation across the Tiber on the connection between sacraments and ethics could easily rehearse the familiar ground of forensic justification, faith formed by charity, real presence, transubstantiation, and any number of other themes that tend to crop up in Lutheran–Roman Catholic discourse. While such themes are certainly important, adopting the hermeneutic of the Finnish School will afford this project a new light under which to address the connection of sacraments and ethics. Therefore, some explanation of the origins and themes of the Finnish School is necessary to situate the discussion.

With that said, if the goal of this book is a conversation across the Tiber, it would behoove us to attend to those who have been wary of such endeavors, such as interpreters of Luther who would be unwilling to surrender the language of forensic justification or divine imputation.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

Consequently, the second half of this section will appropriate the work of one such scholar in an effort to summarize the essential points of this position. In a word, if this discussion adopts the hermeneutic of the Finnish School, what insights of Luther's must it take particular care to preserve in order to remain faithful to his theology and heritage?

The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (The Finnish School)

The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (hereafter the "Finnish School") has its origins in the thought of Tuomo Mannermaa, an emeritus professor of church history at the University of Helsinki. Mannermaa, drawing initial inspiration from Regin Prenter and Georg Kretschmar,¹⁰⁰ has argued that within Luther's thought there is a conception of justification and sanctification that is analogous to the Eastern Orthodox concept of *theosis*. A good deal of the work of the Finnish School has in fact been done in the context of conversations between Finnish Lutherans and Russian Orthodox.¹⁰¹ Mannermaa's main point is that when Luther speaks about justification, he often does so by claiming Christ becomes really—even substantially—present in the believer by faith.¹⁰² In contradistinction to the more traditional interpretation of Luther as maintaining a more "forensic" view of justification (which will be outlined below), Mannermaa's reading of Luther emphasizes in large part the participation of the believer in the very person of Christ.

In order to maintain this reading of Luther as valid, Mannermaa takes pains to distinguish the thought of Luther himself from the

¹⁰⁰ Tuomo Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith: Luther's View of Justification* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 7. Mannermaa cites a specific work by Regin Prenter (*Theologie und Gottesdienst: Gesammelte Aufsätze* [Aarhus: Aros, 1977], 289, n. 10) and explains that he drew support and encouragement for his work both from an article by Kretschmar and extensive subsequent conversations with him (specifically, Georg Kretschmar, "Kreutz und Auferstehung in der Sicht von Athanasios und Luther," in *Der Auferstandene Christus und das Heil der Welt. Das Kirchberger Gespräch über die Bedeutung der Auferstehung für das Heil der Welt zwischen Vertretern der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland und Ruschischen Orthodoxen Kirche*, ed. Kirchliches Ausenamt der EKD, Studienheft 7 [Witten: Luther Verlag, 1972], 40–82.).

¹⁰¹ Tuomo Mannermaa, "Why Is Luther so Fascinating? Modern Finnish Luther Research," in *Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther*, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1998), 1.

¹⁰² Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 18.

thought and formulae of Lutherans that came after him. Mannermaa acknowledges the fact that the Lutheran confessional statements are basically not in accord with his reading of Luther's thought, but he nevertheless maintains that a fresh interpretation of Luther on justification is a legitimate and worthwhile exercise.¹⁰³ One of the main reasons for his boldness in doing so is that the language of the Lutheran confessional documents, most notably the *Formula of Concord*, points back to Luther himself. When the *Formula* explains justification, it finishes the discussion with a reference to Luther's *Lectures on Galatians*, which is far and away the text Mannermaa cites most often and most substantively. Mannermaa also points out that the *Formula* not only cites Luther but also gives Luther's theology sway in this regard over its own articulations.¹⁰⁴ In this way, Mannermaa maintains, the *Formula* leaves open the question of what exactly Luther taught about justification, which gives his interpretation—based as it is on Luther's *Lectures on Galatians*—at least some weight for Lutherans beyond Luther himself.

Mannermaa's point of departure for his project is Luther's concept of Christ as *maxima persona*, "the greatest person," or a kind of corporate person in whom the entire human race is united.¹⁰⁵ The importance of this concept goes beyond thinking of Christ just as the "new Adam"; when speaking of sin and salvation, conceiving of Christ as the *maxima persona* carries with it the conception of Christ as the *maximus peccator* (greatest sinner) and even *solus peccator* (only sinner).¹⁰⁶ If the entirety of our fallen humanity is united in the person of Christ, then the person of Christ contains the sin of the whole world. Or, more correctly, the thought process is *vice versa*: since we know the sins of the whole world have been heaped upon Christ, we can speak of fallen humanity wholly contained in—that is, united in—Christ.¹⁰⁷ The sinfulness of humankind is located entirely in Christ, and sin and death are then obliterated by Christ's life, death, and resurrection.

At this point, the seed of Mannermaa's thesis becomes apparent: if Christ is *solus peccator*, that is, if Christ's humanity implies the real participation by the entirety of fallen human nature in the person of Christ, then salvation ought to be conceived of in a similar way, namely, that

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Luther, *Lectures on Galatians*, quoted in Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 15.

Christ's redemption of humanity implies the real participation by every redeemed human in the person of Christ. Put another way, justifying faith is a real participation in the person of Christ.¹⁰⁸

Such participation is the linchpin of Mannermaa's project and the central theme of the Finnish School—Christian participation in Christ's person (that is, even in God's very essence in Christ) is not solely a moment of divine-human contact; it is also a unification of lives: the human life with Christ's life. To explain this, Mannermaa lifts up Luther's explanations of Christ as both the favor (*favor*) of God and also the gift (*donum*) of God. Put simply, God's favor is given through Christ to the human person in the form of forgiveness. As the human is bound through faith to Christ, in whom all sin has been gathered together and defeated, the human is thereby purged of sin.¹⁰⁹ This purgation is not, however, purely a once-for-all or momentary action by God; this forgiveness—this favor—is accompanied by God's gift (*donum*) of Christ, which persists beyond the moment of forgiveness. Christ as God's gift means that the whole Christ—divine nature and all—is given to the Christian. The Christian then becomes a participant in Christ—again, divine nature and all—as Christ now dwells in the human through faith.¹¹⁰

One would need to be careful about reading into this distinction between Christ as *favor* and Christ as *bonum* the distinction between justification and sanctification. While the distinction is roughly analogous, Mannermaa takes pains to maintain that the separation of the concepts of justification and sanctification is in fact alien to Luther.¹¹¹ For Luther, the unification of the Christian with Christ constitutes a single process, which can be spoken of by distinct terms. The distinction in Luther between justification and sanctification can be roughly conceived of as the distinction between faith and works (or between faith and Christian holiness).¹¹² As such, this distinction is not one of order in a process, as if faith is step 1 and works are step 2. Instead, the relationship between faith and works for Luther, in the reading of the Finnish School, is one of form and matter. Again, the form of faith is Christ, but faith is the form of works.¹¹³ In this way, Christ becomes incarnate in the works of Christians, but such works are not separate

¹⁰⁸ Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 17.

¹⁰⁹ Luther, *Lectures on Galatians*, quoted in Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 18.

¹¹⁰ Mannermaa, *Christ Present in Faith*, 19–22.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 46, 49.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 46.

from the event of justification, since all these concepts are connected directly to the presence of Christ in the believer through faith. This is the basis of the Finnish School and also its culmination—Christ is really present in the Christian through faith, which implies that Christian life is a real participation in the very divine life of Christ.

The Luther of Justification by Divine Imputation

Divinely imputed justification (sometimes referred to as “forensic” justification—a term I will tend to avoid, for reasons to be fleshed out below) is one of the mainstays of Luther interpretation. Lutherans and non-Lutherans alike associate this concept with the Reformer and the ecclesial tradition he inspired,¹¹⁴ and it is inextricable from any careful reflection on Luther’s ideas of grace and salvation. To set the background for this concept in Luther, I use here mainly the thought of Gerhard O. Forde, not because he is the only theologian to carefully consider this area of Luther’s thought, but because a representative example will better serve to set up this idea than would attempting to distill into a few pages the entirety of scholarship on the subject.¹¹⁵ The thought of Forde provides a worthwhile counterpoint to the Finnish School; while the Finnish School has been forged in and further developed with an eye to ecumenical conversation (specifically with the Orthodox), Forde’s writings embody a kind of hesitancy—or in some cases outright suspicion—toward ecumenical dialogues, because of a perceived lack of theological rigor with which he thought they often treat the doctrine of justification.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Stephen J. Duffy, *The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993), 173–220. For a survey of the ways justification has been discussed between Lutherans and Roman Catholics, see Pieter de Witte, *Doctrine, Dynamic and Difference: To the Heart of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic Differentiated Consensus on Justification* (New York: Continuum, 2012).

¹¹⁵ For some other perspectives, see B. A. Gerrish, *Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2005); Heinrich Bornkamm, *Luther’s World of Thought*, trans. Martin H. Bertram (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 2001); or Gerhard Ebeling, *Luther: An Introduction to His Thought*, trans. R. A. Wilson (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2007).

¹¹⁶ Perhaps the clearest example of this suspicion was Forde’s open critique of the 1999 Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. See Gerhard Forde, “The Critical Response of German Theological Professors to the Joint Declaration on Justification,” *dialog* 38 (1999): 71–72; and Forde, et. al., “A Call for Discussion of the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,’” *dialog* 36 (1997): 224–29.

Forde's work and thinking in this vein made him a key figure in what has been called "radical Lutheranism," that is, a movement within Lutheranism whose chief aim has been to keep the Lutheran confessional doctrine of justification at the forefront of Lutheran theological inquiry.¹¹⁷ While this movement is not necessarily the most influential or representative take on Luther's thought and the Lutheran confessions, its ardent focus on the doctrine of justification makes it invaluable for this project; whatever else may be said of Forde and radical Lutheranism, they have been quite careful about parsing out Lutheran thought on justification and grace.

As Forde reads Luther, two distinct paradigms frame the doctrine of justification—paradigms he maintains ought to be complementary. (He does not, however, think they should both be paradigms of justification *per se*; one he associates with justification, and the other he associates with discovery of one's guilt.) The first paradigm is the legal metaphor, wherein we guilty sinners are forgiven by God and held justified. The second is the metaphor of dying to sin and rising to new life.¹¹⁸ Within Lutheranism, both of these metaphors attempt to make sense of justification by divine imputation. (This is the term Forde prefers to the label "forensic" justification, though for all practical purposes the terms seem to connote the same thing.) Justification by divine imputation implies that justification is an action only of God, given to humans regardless of human action or lack thereof. Luther's concept of *sola fide* is closely tied to justification by divine imputation, and Forde depends heavily on it to explain his views on both the legal metaphor of justification and the death/life metaphor.

Forde's work with the legal metaphor for justification generally appears in the form of a critique of the metaphor, but before we move to using his critiques to clarify the metaphor, what exactly is the legal metaphor for justification? At its base, Forde maintains, the legal metaphor is exactly what it sounds like: a metaphor based on the law.¹¹⁹ That the legal metaphor works when speaking about the fall or sin hardly needs explanation (God ordered things a certain way, and we humans are guilty of marring that), but the temptation to carry that metaphor

¹¹⁷ Joseph A. Burgess and Marc Kolden, "Introduction: Gerhard O. Forde and the Doctrine of Justification," in *By Faith Alone: Essays on Justification in Honor of Gerhard O. Forde* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2004), 7.

¹¹⁸ Gerhard O. Forde, *Justification by Faith: A Matter of Death and Life* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 3–4, 8–9.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

through as the primary way to speak about justification can be problematic. In fact, Forde argues that this is the major temptation against which Luther argues with the emphasis on *sola fide*.¹²⁰ In the legal metaphor, if we humans are guilty before God, then justification ought to imply some process by which we humans change from guilty to guiltless. That justification can be conceived of as a *process* or a *movement* is the heart of the legal metaphor of justification, Forde maintains.¹²¹ He locates the “finest form” of this conception in Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*:

Thomas Aquinas . . . defines justification as a movement from a *terminus a quo* to a *terminus ad quem* (a movement from a starting point to a finishing point) involving several steps: a) the infusion of grace (grace *does* come first); b) the movement of the free will toward God in faith; c) the movement of the free will in recoil from sin; and d) remission of guilt.¹²²

Forde does acknowledge that this process of justification in Thomas is not a temporal step-by-step progression, but he nevertheless maintains that in the very structure of conceiving of justification as a process, “the way is open, no doubt, for precisely those distortions which *did* occur in the middle ages.”¹²³ This is the tendency to which Luther was so opposed in adhering to justification by divine imputation and *sola fide*. Justification as a process can lend itself easily to questions of whether one step or another is “fulfilled,” because certainly the human ought to be *doing* something in this movement—or at least we humans ought to *see something happening*. This, for Forde, is where Lutheran views of justification differ from a great portion of Roman Catholic conceptions; in Forde’s view of Luther’s thought, there is no necessary outward change that accompanies justification. Moral progress might be a result of justification, but it has nothing intrinsically to do with justification itself.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 23–26.

¹²¹ Ibid., 25.

¹²² Ibid. Also, from Thomas Aquinas: “There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, namely, the infusion of grace, the movement of the free will toward God by faith, the movement of the free will toward sin, and the remission of sins” (*Summa Theologiae* I–II, q. 113, art. 6; Respondeo dictum quod quatuor enumerantur quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii, scilicet gratiae infusio; motus liberi arbitrii in Deum per fidem; et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; et remissio culpae).

¹²³ Forde, *Justification by Faith*, 25.

Forde's point is that the unconditional nature of justification implied by Luther's *sola fide* militates against the legal metaphor, given as the metaphor is to being thought of as a process, or necessarily including some kind of change or progress. The nagging thought of "surely we humans ought to do *something* for justification" is ever present in the legal metaphor, and any tendency toward that way of thinking, for Forde, misses the point Luther was making with justification by faith alone or justification by divine imputation.¹²⁴ As Forde sees the situation, it can be rather easy for Lutherans to qualify away Luther's *sola fide*. "Adverbial" language about faith and justification creeps in and attempts to make *sola fide* work with the legal metaphor: "really believing," "sincere, heartfelt trust," "living, active faith," "deep repentance," or other such ideas.¹²⁵ For Luther, these may be all well and good, but they are not criteria for justification. The *sola fide* of justification—that it is through faith and by divine imputation—admits of no prerequisites, and the legal metaphor is full of tendencies toward exactly that.

The metaphor that, for Forde, works immeasurably better (that is not to say it works perfectly) in speaking about justification by divine imputation is the metaphor of Romans 6: that of death and new life. Instead of moving through a process of becoming guiltless when we humans were once guilty, Luther's take on justification is that humans become alive when they were once *dead*. This is why Forde maintains that the legal metaphor and the death-life metaphor are complementary; the legal metaphor works so far as the law is concerned, but when grace enters the mix, death and life is the proper metaphor. In Forde's words:

The order of the legal metaphor is always life-death. You can do the law only as long as you are alive; you have to earn your points while you can. For the legal metaphor is a matter, as we say, of "life and death." When you die it's too late. If you die you shall not live. The law grants possibility up to death; after death, no more possibility.¹²⁶

The point Forde makes here is that we humans, by sin, are all in the "after death" part of the equation. The law defines the boundaries, and we humans have crossed them into sin and death. Consequently, justification cannot be just a removal of guilt while humans are dead to sin; such a move attempts to take the legal metaphor beyond its own limits;

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

that is, if humans are already dead in sin, no change or process can (within the legal metaphor) “fix” the deadness. Humans are *dead* in sin; what is needed is *life*, not law. Such life is precisely what Luther sees in justification by divine imputation, or the *sola fide* of justification: it is a resurrection of the human into *new* life, not a continuation of the old “life” that was sin and death. What is, under the legal metaphor, a “repair” of a continuously existing human subject is, under the death/life metaphor, the resurrection of the dead human to new life in Christ.¹²⁷ In a word, the complementarity of the legal metaphor with the death-life metaphor is, in Forde’s interpretation of Luther, the “complementarity” of the law and the gospel. The law kills, and the gospel makes alive. Humans are dead in sin, condemned by the law, but in justification they are raised to new life in Christ.

One ought to ask the question at this point, what exactly does the death-life metaphor evoke from Luther that solves or avoids the problems with which the legal metaphor collides? Should humans not still see some “progress” associated with being resurrected out of death and sin? Isn’t there still a “process” or “movement” from death into life? Forde addresses these questions not by answering them directly but by pointing out that within the death-life metaphor through which Luther views justification—again, that Forde sees as the only appropriate one—such questions are the incorrect ones to ask; they border on category mistakes. Movement or progress assumes a *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem*, and death and life are inappropriate stand-ins for these terms; humans do not move *from* death *into* life. Humans are resurrected: they are dead in sin, and God raises them. There is no discernable process (humanly speaking); the whole affair is the action of God, for which humans do not have criteria or readily readable markers.

In this vein, one might also ask the question of whether faith itself is not some kind of process or—even more problematically—some kind of human action. In Luther, divine imputation and *sola fide* go together, so how is the imputation not consequent upon a *sola fide* action? Such a question is hardly new, but again Forde maintains that, in Luther, this is a category mistake. Faith, Forde maintains, is for Luther “not an active verb. . . . It is a state-of-being verb.”¹²⁸ Faith is not an assent of the intellect, nor is it a conviction of the will, nor is it even a conscious trust, insofar as such trust requires human action. Faith can be conceived of

¹²⁷ Ibid., 17.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 22.

as “trust,” but it is more of a passive trust, bordering on simple recognition of the state of reality (not unlike someone may be said to “trust” in gravity). In Forde’s words, “Faith is the state of being grasped by the unconditional claim and promise of the God who calls into being that which is from that which is not. Faith means now having to deal with life on those terms. It is a death and a resurrection.”¹²⁹

By faith humans recognize a new situation, one different from the old situation of sin and death. (Or, more correctly, they recognize the old situation of sin and death as the old situation of sin and death, and this recognition itself is a new situation.) This is the way in which Luther’s concept of justification by divine imputation requires *sola fide* and *vice versa*. God declares the human justified, and in doing so reveals the human’s sin for what it is. Justification by divine imputation includes not simply imputed justice but also the revelation by faith (*sola fide*) of human sinfulness: “By declaring us righteous unilaterally, unconditionally for Christ’s sake, [God] at the same time unmasks sin and unfaith.”¹³⁰

The question may remain, however, that if justification by divine imputation and by faith alone requires a departure from the legal metaphor, what can be said of sanctification in Luther? I bring this up not because sanctification is the primary focus here, but because the temptation to use the legal metaphor—the metaphor of process and progress—has a tendency to return in full force after being expunged from the theology of justification. If human life can be characterized by a daily dying to sin and rising again in Christ,¹³¹ then surely we may be able to speak of the whole set of those human experiences as an overall “process” of sanctification. Luther’s answer to this (so Forde maintains) is only a certain kind of yes:

The “progress” of the Christian . . . is the progress of one who has constantly to get used to the fact that we are justified totally by faith, constantly has somehow to “recover,” so to speak, from that death blow to pride and presumption—or better, is constantly being raised from the tomb of all pious ambition to something quite new. The believer has to

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 31.

¹³¹ This is something Luther wanted all Christians to connect with the sacraments (particularly baptism), as he includes the idea in his *Small Catechism* (Martin Luther, *The Small Catechism*, in *The Book of Concord*, ed. Timothy J. Wengert and Robert Kolb, trans. Charles Arand, et al., [Minneapolis, Fortress, 2000], 360).

be renewed daily in that. The Old Being is to be drowned daily in repentance and raised in faith. The progress in the Christian life is not our movement toward the goal; it is the movement of the goal in upon us.¹³²

For Forde, what is ultimately at stake in emphasizing the death and life metaphor for justification (and sanctification) is the heart of Luther's theology itself. To his reading, losing sight of justification as divinely imputed—as he might say the Finnish School does, in its formula of justification as unification with Christ—endangers the core insights of Reformation theology in general, and Lutheran theology in particular. That said, this book proceeds with the conviction that these two Lutheran models for conceiving of justification can stand together. Further, as we will see in chapter 2, this project adopts the Finnish School as a hermeneutic, not to circumvent Luther's insights regarding justification, but to cast new light on them, especially as they play out at the intersection between sacraments and ethics.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided four areas of background information on which to base the following chapter discussions and within which those discussions fit. To begin, the chapter summarized the development of the Liturgical Movement in the United States, highlighting some of its main proponents and tracing it through the Second Vatican Council. Then, the chapter briefly focused on three theologians whose work represents at least partially the current avenues of inquiry in the field of liturgy and ethics. Next, the chapter traced the philosophical influences that bear upon Chauvet's theology, especially as it will be engaged in this project. Finally, the chapter closed by reviewing two strains of Luther interpretation, the Finnish school that will provide the hermeneutical approach of this project's engagement with Luther, and Forde's radical Lutheranism that provides a caution against being swept away from Luther's core insights. Having done all this, the book is situated in an ideal spot to proceed, which it does by engaging Luther and the way he views the connection of sacraments and ethics.

¹³² Forde, *Justification by Faith*, 31.